Vendor Intelligence Report: Shenzhen Loga Tech LG LOGA

Executive summary

Across 32 Finnrick lab tests, Shenzhen LOGA records 24 pass and 8 fail, an overall pass rate of 75%. That headline is useful, but it is not the buyer decision. LOGA reads as a narrow-use vendor: ipamorelin is the cleanest line, retatrutide has the strongest depth, while tirzepatide and BPC-157 carry the failures that change the risk equation.

The problem is not just ordinary variance. The tirzepatide record includes a vial with no active ingredient and a later major underdose; BPC-157 includes a large overdose. Ratings also become less reassuring under stricter grading, especially where dosing, not just purity, is the failure mode. For LOGA, a generic COA is not enough; lot traceability is weak across major samples.

The corporate trail adds a separate diligence burden. Archived captures show ssemaglutide.com moving from Shanghai Longtide branding to Shenzhen LOGA, including a mid-rebrand state where the new header and old footer coexisted. The timing follows a Reuters Ozempic-copy supply-chain report involving the predecessor identity, while older Alibaba and Made-in-China profiles disappeared from public view.

The live operation is also unusually thin for verification: ordering routes through WhatsApp rather than a standard checkout, public social icons still point to Dartmouth placeholder accounts, and the catalog includes 1,4-butanediol/14b with Sydney Warehouse and USA Stock claims. Even if a buyer only wants peptides, that chemical listing is a vendor-level operational risk.

Inside the full report:

• Per-product Finnrick pass/fail analysis, dosing outliers, methodology-divergence charts, and Appendix A lab data for all 6 tested products
• Wayback captures documenting the Shanghai Longtide to Shenzhen LOGA transition, including the mixed header/footer rebrand artifact
• Marketplace footprint review covering the deleted Alibaba store, unavailable Made-in-China profile, and surviving Drugdu record
• Current-site evidence: contact page, Hong Kong WhatsApp sales channels, Wezhan infrastructure, and Dartmouth placeholder social links
• Controlled-substance catalog analysis of the 1,4-BD listing, including Sydney/USA stock claims and regulatory context
• Practical buyer controls for channel verification, batch-specific COAs, received-vial testing, and product selection

Risk assessment

• Tirzepatide quality-control risk — high: Tirzepatide has 7 tests (5 pass / 2 fail) but includes a 40 mg vial with zero active ingredient and a 63% underdose; most samples lacked batch IDs.
• BPC-157 quality-control risk — high: BPC-157 has 5 tests (3 pass / 2 fail), including a 43% overdose; no BPC-157 samples carried batch IDs.
• Cagrilintide data-scarcity and failure risk — medium: Cagrilintide has 1 test (0 pass / 1 fail) and a 55.44% rating; treat it as unproven rather than validated.
• Regulatory-adjacent catalog risk from 1,4-butanediol — high: ssemaglutide.com lists 1,4-BD/14b (CAS 110-64-5), a GHB precursor, with Sydney Warehouse and USA Stock claims.
• Corporate identity-erasure risk — high: Wayback captures tie ssemaglutide.com from Shanghai Longtide to Shenzhen LOGA; the rebrand followed Reuters exposure and B2B storefronts were removed.
• Unapproved semaglutide-promotion history — high: Predecessor Shanghai Longtide was named by Reuters promoting Semagcare, an unapproved semaglutide product associated with regulator seizures/rejections of similar goods.
• Lot-traceability risk across tested peptides — medium: No batch IDs on BPC-157 or semaglutide samples and sparse IDs on tirzepatide/retatrutide undermine lot-level COA matching.
• Opaque payment and recourse risk — medium: No standard checkout; ordering is via WhatsApp and Finnrick payment-method satisfaction is 1.8/5, limiting buyer recourse.