Vendor Intelligence Report: Shanghai Sigma Audley SSA
Published 12 Jun 2026. 28-page investigative report on who is behind Shanghai Sigma Audley SSA: corporate records, ownership, affiliate networks, and the vendor's lab-testing record. The first 3 pages are free to read on this page.
Researched and published by Finnrick Analytics. Reports draw on corporate records, affiliate-network analysis, and Finnrick's own laboratory testing record; vendors can challenge findings through the formal objections process at finnrick.com/vendor-support/objections.
Executive summary
Shanghai Sigma Audley SSA is no longer a simple vendor-quality read. This report separates the historical SSA operation from the current storefront using the name: records show the original brand went dark in September 2025, while a later domain presents a polished peptide shop with fake verification signals, lookalike staff personas, and irreversible payment rails. Finnrick’s public directory warning is direct: do not purchase from sigmaaudley.site.
Across 220 Finnrick lab tests, SSA records 150 pass and 70 fail — overall pass rate 68%. The data is uneven rather than uniformly bad: Retatrutide and Tirzepatide are comparatively stronger in aggregate, while Sermorelin and BPC-157 are poor relative choices. The stronger GLP-1 lines still carry separate public failures in the record, so legacy inventory needs batch-level evidence, not brand memory.
The background record changes the supply-chain read. Chainalysis identifies Sigma Audley as a former fentanyl-precursor supplier that later pivoted to retail peptides using the same contact infrastructure; corporate records point to a Shenzhen chemical/cosmetic-scope entity, not a Shanghai pharmaceutical manufacturer. Those facts do not prove every historic vial was bad, but they make vendor claims and self-issued COAs especially weak anchors.
For buyers, the conclusion is directional: already-held historic SSA material should be judged product-by-product and batch-by-batch; any new “SSA” purchase now faces authenticity and payment-fraud risk before potency is even tested.
Inside the full report:
- Appendix A lab data with per-product pass/fail rates, methodology-divergence charts, and spark-grid trajectories for all 12 tested products
- WHOIS comparison of sigmaaudley.com, sigmaaudley.net, and sigmaaudley.site with timeline anchors
- Fraud-site captures showing fake Janoshik/Trustpilot-style verification, warehouse claims, and payment rails
- Corporate registration analysis for Sigma Audley New Material Technology Co., Ltd., including Shenzhen domicile and license-scope mismatch
- Chainalysis-derived precursor-to-peptide continuity analysis and contact-infrastructure mapping
- Case notes on the Tirzepatide identity substitution and Retatrutide sterility failure
Risk assessment
- Copycat / brand-confusion and payment-fraud risk — high: sigmaaudley.site was registered after the reported SSA shutdown, uses fake verification/trust claims and irreversible payments, and no authoritative channel list or anti-counterfeit system was documented.
- Product-specific quality and sterility risk — high: Weak Finnrick ratings for Sermorelin (20.4%), CJC-1295 (25.53%), BPC-157 (33.06%) and Tesamorelin (39.16%), plus Tirzepatide rHGH substitution and Retatrutide 30mg sterility failure.
- Prior illicit-precursor supply-chain risk — high: Chainalysis identified Sigma Audley as a fentanyl-precursor supplier, with the same +86 15036102190 contact infrastructure later used in peptide retail.
- Fulfillment-continuity risk — high: Community records indicate all SSA representatives went dark on 2025-09-12; the known .com domain is expired and later brand traffic is dominated by impersonation warnings.
- Corporate transparency / licensing-mismatch risk — medium: The located entity is Shenzhen-registered, not Shanghai-registered; documented scope is chemical/cosmetic rather than pharmaceutical peptide manufacturing, and B2B claims conflict with registry details.